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Introduction 
While the social role of public companies is an issue that has bubbled near the surface 
of broader debates about corporate governance for some time now,
1
 only fairly 
recently has corporate social responsibility become an issue of such prominence that it 
has earned its own acronym: ‘CSR’ has been the subject of numerous non-binding 
declarations by governmental bodies, non-governmental organisations and business 
groups, particularly in the last decade.
2
 While there is no clear consensus about what 
exactly CSR means, at a minimum the term implies an obligation on the part of large 
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1
 In the United States, arguments about the purposes and public obligations of corporations date from at 
least the 1930s. See, e.g., A. A. Berle, Jr., ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’, Harvard Law Review 
44 (1931), 1049; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’, Harvard Law 
Review 45 (1932), 1145; A. A. Berle, Jr., ‘For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note’, 
Harvard Law Review 45 (1932), 1365. 
2
 Early examples are the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, a series of recommendations 
first issued in 1976 as part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, and the Global Sullivan 
Principles, launched in 1977 by Reverend Leon Sullivan of Philadelphia and initially directed at US 
companies with investments in South Africa. Both statements subsequently have been expanded in 
their scope. Other examples of influential declarations include the United Nations’ Global Compact, a 
statement of nine principles proclaimed in 1999 and meant to serve as the foundation for a UN-
sponsored platform for promoting good corporate practices; the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies’ Statement of Principles, made in 1989, and the Global Reporting Initiative’s 
Sustainability Guidelines, issued in 1999, which focused on the environmental consequences of 
corporate activities; the Caux Round Table’s Principles for Business, first published by a coalition of 
business leaders in 1994; the ETI Base Code, issued in 1998 by the Ethical Business Initiative, a 
coalition of trade unions, non-governmental organisations and business groups based on various 
conventions adopted by the International Labour Organisation; and Social Accountability 8000 
(SA8000), a set of standards for the protection of workers’ rights promulgated by the Council on 
Economic Priorities Accreditation Agency in 1997.  
 2 
companies to pursue objectives advancing the interests of all groups (or 
‘stakeholders’, in today’s parlance) affected by their activities – not just shareholders 
but also employees, consumers, suppliers, creditors and local communities. These 
interests are not just economic but also include environmental, human rights and 
‘quality of life’ concerns. The obligation to be socially responsible is usually 
conceived of as being over and above the minimum requirements imposed on 
companies by formal legal rules,
3
 although this is not invariably the case.
4
 
 
As a concept, CSR directly challenges the dominant Anglo-American paradigm of 
corporate governance,
5
 which emphasises profit-maximisation for investors as the 
most efficient means of promoting wealth creation for society as a whole. Consistent 
with this paradigm, the corporate governance debate in the United Kingdom has 
focused primarily on making those who run companies accountable to those who 
effectively own them, the company’s members (shareholders), and the preoccupation 
of company law has been with assuring that company directors act in the best interests 
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 See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission 
Concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to Sustainable Development 
(Brussels, 2.7.2002) Com. (2002) 347 final, p. 5; Department of Trade and Industry, Business and 
Society: Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2002, p. 7. 
4
 Mandatory legislation sometimes contains what are classified as CSR initiatives. Recent examples 
include the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which provided that UK companies and 
company directors could be prosecuted for bribery and corruption offences wherever they are 
committed in the world (sections 108-10); amendments to the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1998 
which disallowed tax deductions for payments made outside the UK which would be criminal offences 
if made within the UK; and the Employment Act 2002 and Maternity and Parental Leave etc. and the 
Paternity and Adoption Leave (Amendment) Regulations 2006 SI 2006 No. 2014,  concerning 
entitlement to maternity, paternity, and adoption leave and pay. Mandatory environmental, health and 
safety, and anti-discrimination laws are also sometimes seen as part of the CSR agenda. 
5
 For purposes of the issues addressed in this chapter, it is useful to refer to an Anglo-American model 
of corporate governance that is distinguishable from models prevalent in continental Europe. 
Notwithstanding differences between capitalism as experienced in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, particularly in connection with welfare provision, there are strong parallels between the two 
countries in connection with the historical evolution of the corporate form, the law governing it, 
corporate governance structures and preferred methods of raising finance capital. 
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of the company for the benefit of its members.
6
 Policy-makers have been reluctant to 
interfere with this system – for example, by requiring direct participation of other 
stakeholder groups in the management of economically significant companies, or by 
imposing legally-enforceable duties on directors that would benefit groups other than 
shareholders – and have instead preferred to encourage companies to adopt CSR 
policies voluntarily. Thus, instead of compelling companies to adopt CSR-related 
policies or undertake CSR-related activities, the present Government’s strategy for 
encouraging corporate social responsibility has been to require companies to publicly 
disclose such policies and activities. In recent years, partly as a consequence of 
Government pressures from within the UK and elsewhere, there has been a significant 
growth in CSR self-reporting, with ‘social responsibility’ statements becoming a 
common feature in company annual reports. 
 
A basic assumption underlies the Government’s disclosure strategy: that a company’s 
interests – and the interests of its shareholders – are best served by maintaining a 
‘positive’ CSR profile (the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ theory). CSR activities, it 
is assumed, are value-creating because they strengthen a company’s relationships with 
its key stakeholders and because they make the company more attractive to potential 
customers. This would positively affect a publicly-traded company’s share price: if 
                                                 
6
 In this regard, it has been said that the UK corporate system revolves around three groups – directors, 
shareholders and auditors – with shareholders and auditors monitoring the activities of directors to 
ensure that they do not act in a way that is contrary to the best interests of the company. See Saleem 
Sheikh, ‘Introduction to the Corporate Governance Themed Issue’, International Company and 
Commercial Law Review 9 (1998), 267. The important role of institutional shareholders in the UK was 
addressed in 2001 by the Myners Report, which called for pension fund managers to take a more 
proactive role in the companies in which they invested. The report argued that they should take ‘an 
active interest in the appointment and performance of non-executive directors, exhibiting vigilance in 
determining an appropriate degree of independence and a proper level of engagement’. Institutional 
Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (2001), p. 93.  
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investors believe that disclosure of information demonstrating that a company has a 
‘good’ CSR record will enhance the value of a company, this will be reflected in the 
price investors are willing to pay for the company’s shares. Financial economists 
postulate that for a publicly-traded company, the most relevant measure of investor 
perceptions of the value of a company is the market price of the company’s shares. In 
a properly functioning market, a company’s share price will reflect the collective 
assessment made by investors of all available relevant information about that 
company and expectations about the company’s future cash flows. If this is true, it is 
possible to test the validity of the voluntarism principle at the heart of the 
Government’s CSR policy by comparing the market performance of companies 
perceived to have a good CSR record with that of publicly-traded companies that are 
not. 
 
This chapter will consider how CSR affects the value of companies to shareholders by 
examining the market performance of companies included in the recently introduced 
FTSE4Good ethical indices. Developed by the FTSE Group, an independent company 
that creates and manages indices and related data services used by investment 
analysts, the FTSE4Good indices provide the ‘ethical investment’ sector with tools to 
measure the performance of companies meeting certain CSR criteria. While FTSE has 
been criticised for failing to apply their criteria as stringently as they might, 
nonetheless inclusion in the FTSE4Good indices is, in itself, a signal to the 
investment community that a company has a desirable CSR reputation. By comparing 
the companies included in these indices with excluded companies and the market as a 
whole, it is possible to obtain some empirical evidence concerning investor percep-
tions of the value-creating potential of CSR activities. 
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The next section will examine in greater detail the legal approach to corporate social 
responsibility under the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. The 
Government’s CSR strategy is predicated on the notion that companies will produce 
‘public goods’ at levels beyond what is strictly required by law, a notion that 
challenges the neo-classical conception of the company as a strictly profit-maximising 
entity. In order to reconcile CSR with established assumptions about the purposes of 
companies and company law, it is necessary to justify the pursuit of CSR objectives 
as ultimately being in the company’s economic interests. We then discuss the 
emergence of ethical investment indices in general and the FTSE4Good indices in 
particular, examining the measurement method employed by FTSE to select 
companies for these indices. Finally, we describe the results of the empirical tests 
used to measure the relative performance of companies included in the FTSE4Good 
indices. By studying the apparent growth of CSR activity from these various 
perspectives, we can better evaluate whether New Labour’s approach in encouraging 
corporate social responsibility will have a meaningful effect on corporate conduct. 
 
 6 
Contextualising corporate social responsibility 
 
1. The Anglo-American Model of Corporate Governance 
The notion that companies – or at least ‘companies of economic significance’7 – 
should act in a ‘socially responsible’ manner begs more fundamental questions about 
the nature and purposes of companies. Under the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance, a company is considered to be the product of individual initiative, 
possessing powers conferred by its members, and the purpose of companies is to 
maximise the profits of those members.
8
 This has not always been the case: before the 
mid-nineteenth century, the corporate entity was widely conceived as an artificial 
creation of the State and entirely dependant on the State for its powers, and 
incorporation was thought not only to confer privileges on incorporators but to impose 
responsibilities to further the general public welfare.
9
 The relationship between 
corporate activity and the public welfare was explicit, and company law could almost 
be seen as an aspect of public law.
10
 After the emergence of general incorporation 
statutes, however,
11
 the company was gradually reconceptualised as fundamentally 
private in nature. So conceived, many questioned the legitimacy of asking corporate 
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 Whether a company is a ‘company of economic significance’, of course, is often a subject of debate. 
Tests that have been used have taken into account factors such as whether the company is private or 
publicly-traded; the size of the company’s annual turnover or balance sheet; and the number of persons 
employed by the company. 
8
 See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 15. 
9
 David Millon, ‘Theories of the Corporation’, Duke Law Journal (1990) 201. . 
10
 Ibid., 211. 
11
 See, e.g., Joint Stock Companies Act 1844. 
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executives to spend money ‘belonging’ to the company’s owners to further social 
interests commonly thought to be the responsibility of the State.
12
 
 
In the United Kingdom, the modern foundations of company law were laid by the 
Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. As Walter Horrwitz observed, this Act was adopted 
when ‘liberalism was at its peak’, and ‘the guiding principle then fixed was fullest 
freedom for shareholders in the formation and management of companies on the 
condition that fullest information was given to the public’.13 Company law has 
evolved since then into a fragmented system of minimal common law and statutory 
duties and relatively more expansive self-regulation through, for example, the City 
Code issued by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers
14
 and the codes of best practice 
and corporate governance applicable to companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange.
15
 This system is predicated upon a philosophy of minimal state 
interference with the freedom and flexibility of companies to interpret and respond to 
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 Milton Friedman, for example, dismissed CSR as a dangerous ‘socialist’ concept in a 1970 article 
published in the New York Times Magazine: see Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of 
Business is to Increase Its Profits’, reprinted in W. Michael Hoffman and Jennifer Mills Moore, 
Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality, 2nd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1990), pp. 153-57. Apparently Friedman later moderated his views. See Saleem Sheikh, Corporate 
Social Responsibilities: Law and Practice (London: Cavendish, 1996), pp. 24-27. 
13
 Walter Horrwitz, ‘Historical Development of Company Law’, Law Quarterly Review 62 (1946), 
375. 
14
 See City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (‘Takeover Code’) and the Rules Governing Substantial 
Acquisitions of Shares (‘SARs’), collectively referred to as ‘the Code’. 
15
 See, e.g., The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice (May 
2000), at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode.pdf, which was based on the Final Report of the 
Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance (London: Gee, 1998), the Report of the Committee on 
the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London: Gee, 1992) (‘The Cadbury Report’), and 
Directors’ Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury (London: Gee, 
1995) (‘the Greenbury Report’). The Hampel Committee’s Combined Code has been replaced by The 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (July 2003), available at http://www..frc.org.uk, in response 
to Derek Higgs’ Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (January 2003), at 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file23012.pdf, and the report by Sir Robert Smith’s Group, Audit 
Committees Combined Code Guidance (January 2003), at 
http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/ACReport.pdf. Applicable to all companies listed 
on the London Stock Exchange from 1 November 2003, the new Code, like its predecessor, requires 
listed companies to describe how they apply the Code’s main and supporting principles and state 
whether they comply with the Code’s provisions. 
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market forces. Moreover, it is centred upon a model of agency which sees the 
company’s owners (the shareholders) as principals and company directors as their 
agents. The owners appoint their agents to run the company, and the agents are 
required to report back to their principals periodically. While a company’s directors 
may delegate their management function to others, they are ultimately responsible to 
the shareholders for how a company is operated. 
 
Economically, this model has been justified as the most effective and efficient way to 
promote wealth maximisation for society as a whole: giving the owners of companies 
the freedom to pursue their self-interest will lead to productive and allocative 
efficiency.
16
 Companies are the most desirable form of business organisation, and 
favouring shareholders will induce market investment and thus facilitate the 
capitalisation of companies.
17
 Legally, this model is effectuated through a rights-
orientated approach that recognises and gives priority to property interests in shares. 
Strictly speaking, the duties imposed on those who manage a company are owed to 
the ‘company’, but the company’s interests are usually equated with the interests of 
the company’s present and future shareholders.18 There are limited exceptions to this 
general rule: directors have a duty to consider the interests of employees in 
                                                 
16
 Productive efficiency is maximised when production takes place at the lowest possible cost, 
minimising the waste of resources; allocative efficiency is maximised when goods and services are 
produced in the quantity and quality demanded by consumers. 
17
 In addition, favouring the position of shareholders potentially provides motivation for shareholders 
to exercise a supervisory role in relation to the conduct of corporate managers. 
18
 See, e.g., J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company 
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 76-92. Parkinson notes that a requirement to benefit an 
artificial entity like ‘the company’ is, in and of itself, meaningless; an inanimate legal fiction does not 
really have ‘interests’ to protect. See ibid., p. 76. As Megarry J. observed in Gaiman v. Association for 
Mental Health [1971] Ch. 317, p. 330, ‘I would accept the interests of both present and future members 
of the company as a whole, as being a helpful expression of a human equivalent’ to the legal notion of 
‘the interests of the company’. 
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performing their functions (although this duty is virtually unenforceable);
19
 and 
directors are required to consider the interests of creditors when the company is 
insolvent or on the verge of insolvency.
20
  In most situations, however, the notion that 
directors’ duties are owed to a corporate ‘entity’ is simply a vehicle for protecting the 
interests of one group of stakeholders, the company’s shareholders, at the expense of 
other groups affected by the company’s activities. While courts will not necessarily 
interfere if a company’s directors decide to award other stakeholders, such as 
employees or local communities, with benefits or gratuities that go beyond the strict 
limits of the company’s legal obligations,21 they do require that the ultimate objective 
in awarding these benefits must be ‘getting the greatest profit from the business of the 
company’ that is possible22 – for example by allowing the company to recruit and 
retain the best employees or improve employee productivity. Finally, to the extent that 
unconstrained profit-maximisation harms the interests of other groups affected by 
corporate activities or causes social problems, the Anglo-American system has 
preferred to deal with these problems from the ‘outside’ – through legal requirements 
and prohibitions imposed by primary or secondary legislation – rather than the 
‘inside’ – by incorporating non-shareholder interests into corporate decision-making 
itself. 
                                                 
19
 See Companies Act 1985, s. 309 (originally enacted as s. 46 of the Companies Act 1980). Section 
309 has been described as ‘cosmetic’ because employees lack the locus standi to bring enforcement 
actions on behalf of the company unless they are also company shareholders. Sheikh, ‘Introduction to 
the Corporate Governance Themed Issue’, 268. See also Ben Pettet, ‘Duties in Respect of Employees 
under the Companies Act 1980’ Current Legal Problems 34 (1981), 199. Section 719 of the Companies 
Act 1985 (originally s. 74 of the Companies Act 1980) allows a company to ‘make provision’ for 
current or former employees upon cessation or transfer of the company’s business, provided this is 
sanctioned by the company’s memorandum or articles, an ordinary resolution, or a resolution of the 
directors. 
20
 See Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 627; Insolvency Act 1986, s. 214. See 
also Andrew Keay, ‘The Duty of Directors to Take Account of Creditors’ Interests: Has It Any Role to 
Play?’, Journal of Business.Law. (2002), 379. 
21
 See, e.g., Hampson v. Price’s Patent Candle Co. (1876) 24 W.R. 754. 
22
 Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co. (1993) 23 Ch. D. 654, at pp. 665-66 (Cotton L.J.). 
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The shareholder primacy at the heart of the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model has not gone unchallenged. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., in a US law review article 
published in 1932, argued that a concept of citizenship applicable to individuals – a 
concept that envisages that sometimes social circumstances require pursuit of other-
regarding goals that do not necessarily benefit the individual financially – should also 
apply to ‘corporate persons’, and that it should be within the legitimate powers of a 
company’s managers to disregard the company’s purely economic self-interest to 
further other compelling social obligations.
23
 This argument recognises that the 
activities of large, publicly-traded companies affect a wider range of interests than 
simply those of investors, and asserts in effect that the ‘company’ to which directors 
owe duties encompasses those interests as well as the economic interests of 
shareholders. For example, it is often the case that creditors, employees and local 
communities bear a far greater risk of loss in the event of a company’s failure than the 
company’s ‘owners’, who individually may possess only a small fraction of the 
company’s shares and are in any event protected by the doctrine of limited liability.24 
A good corporate ‘citizen’ sometimes must act in a way that shareholders might 
oppose, even if not expressly required to do so by the strictures of the law (or even by 
considerations of ‘enlightened self-interest’), and such actions should not be regarded 
as legally or ethically suspect.
25
 
 
                                                 
23
 See Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’, 1161-62. 
24
 Moreover, many interests affected by corporate activity – job security and job satisfaction, the 
environment, the stability of communities in which a company’s operations are centred – cannot be 
translated into economic formulae allowing easy comparison with the financial interests of 
shareholders. 
25
 See Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’, 1161. 
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Ultimately, Dodd’s pluralist vision of corporate governance was not realised. Adolph 
Berle, for example, argued that if the managers of economically significant companies 
were allowed to pursue social objectives on behalf of vaguely defined interest groups, 
they would be able to exercise tremendous economic, social and political power 
without really being accountable to anyone.
26
 Berle felt that the only effective way to 
place limits on the power of corporate executives was to make them legally 
answerable to the one identifiable group unambiguously affected by the company’s 
activities – its shareholders – who through self-interest will monitor management’s 
activities. In fact, the problem of accountability caused by the separation of ownership 
and management in large, publicly-traded companies soon came to dominate 
corporate governance discourse in the United States
27
 and concerns about corporate 
social responsibility faded to the background.
28
 This does not mean that US 
executives did not want to cultivate an image of their companies as caring, socially 
responsive institutions. But their primary motives seemed to have been to discourage 
adoption and stricter application of mandatory legislation and anti-monopoly laws and 
to obtain public relations benefits that could be used for marketing purposes.
29
 
                                                 
26
 See Berle, ‘For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees’, 1367-69. See also Adolph A. Berle and 
Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Macmillan, 1932), 
p. 310; ‘As an economic organism grows in strength and its power is concentrated in a few hands ... the 
demand for responsible power becomes increasingly direct’. 
27
 See especially Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation. The mainstream view came to be that 
without a reaction to the actions of managers by investors in the stock market, those managers would 
be largely unaccountable. The theory is that managers are made accountable by competition in the 
managerial labour market (investors will force the replacement of under-performing managers) and by 
the corporate takeover market (a company performing at sub-optimal levels will have stock prices 
below its true value, making it an attractive takeover target). See Jonathan P. Charkham, Keeping Good 
Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 
308-19; Henry Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, Journal of Political Economy 
73 (1965), 110. 
28
 They did not disappear, however. See, e.g., Howard R. Bowen, Social Responsibilities of the 
Businessman (New York: Harper, 1953); J. W. McGuire, Business and Society (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1963). 
29
 See Sally Wheeler, Corporations and the Third Way (Oxford: Hart, 2002), p. 34. See also Roland 
Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in 
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In the United Kingdom, CSR remained in ‘the realm of “otherness”’30 until the 1970s, 
when mainstream participants in public policy debates, like the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI), began suggesting that companies must ‘have functions, duties 
and moral obligations that go beyond the immediate pursuit of profit and the 
requirements of the law’.31 Shortly thereafter, shareholder primacy was directly 
challenged when the Bullock Committee contemplated employee representation on 
company boards.
32
 This period also saw a dramatic rise in academic interest in 
corporate governance issues in general and CSR in particular, an interest that has 
rarely subsided since then.
33
 Often those expressing dissatisfaction with the dominant 
Anglo-American paradigm looked to the alternative models of corporate governance 
used in countries like Germany and Japan, whose economies were once considered 
more successful than those of the United States or Britain. Particularly popular – at 
least before the economic stresses of reunification damaged the reputation of the 
                                                                                                                                            
American Big Business (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998); Andrea Tone, The 
Business of Benevolence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
30
 Wheeler, Corporations and the Third Way, p. 34. Wheeler notes that for many years, CSR was 
marginalised from mainstream corporate governance debate, seen as ‘being the province of non-
conformists such as Congregationalists and Quakers’. Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
31
 ibid., p. 35, quoting Confederation of British Industry, A New Look at the Responsibilities of the 
British Public Company (London: Confederation of British Industry, 23 January 1973). Around the 
same time, the accounting profession began devising methods for measuring and publicising a 
company’s community activities: ibid., p. 36.  
32
 Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, Report (1977) Cmnd. 6706. 
33
 Leading works include Charkham, Keeping Good Company; Janice Dean, Directing Public 
Companies: Company Law and the Stakeholder Society (London: Cavendish, 2001); Will Hutton, The 
State We’re In (London: Cape, 1995); Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility; John Plender, A 
Stake in the Future: The Stakeholding Solution (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1997); Sheikh, Corporate 
Social Responsibilities; Wheeler Corporations and the Third Way; G. Kelly and J. E. Parkinson, ‘The 
Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist Approach’, Company, Financial and Insolvency 
Law Review (1998), 174; Paddy Ireland, ‘Corporate Governance, Stakeholding, and the Company: 
Towards a Less Degenerate Capitalism’, Journal of Law and Society 23 (1996), 287; Ben Pettet, ‘The 
Stirring of Corporate Social Conscience: From ‘Cakes and Ale’ to Community Programmes’ Current 
Legal Problems 50 (1997), 279. See also Max B. E. Clarkson (ed.), The Corporation and Its 
Stakeholders: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998); 
Klaus J. Hopt and Gunther Teubner (eds), Corporate Governance and Directors’ Liability: Legal, 
Economic and Sociological Analyses of Corporate Social Responsibility (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1984). 
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German system – was the so-called Rhine Model of corporate governance, which was 
far less rights-orientated than its Anglo-American counterpart.
34
 The Rhine Model 
conceived the primary function of companies not as profit-maximisation but as 
assuring that goods and services that a community needs are delivered on a continuing 
basis.
35
 Profits were important, but only as a means to serve this ultimate purpose. 
This greater emphasis on protecting stakeholders other than shareholders is in part 
reflected in, and in part a consequence of, the legal rules governing the dual-board 
management structure of German companies. For example, German law gave Work 
Councils rights to co-determination with the Management Board in connection with 
dismissal, employee vocational training and grievances; employees were legally 
entitled to representation on the Supervisory Board of larger companies; and rules 
requiring banks to act as proxies for shareholders at general meetings assured that a 
company’s major creditors often had a strong influence over corporate behaviour.36 
 
While CSR debates continued to be waged by academics in the 1980s and 1990s, it 
dropped from the policy agenda with the ascendancy of the New Right and its 
attendant social and economic priorities. In the Thatcher era, Milton Friedman’s 
argument that ‘the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’ won out. 
The pursuit of goals other than profit by company managers was deemed 
economically inefficient (and thus damaging to the long-term well-being of society as 
                                                 
34
 The foundation of the German system could be found in Article 14(2) of the Basic Law, at 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#14, which proclaimed that ‘property imposes duties [and 
its] use shall also serve the public good’. 
35
 Charkham, Keeping Good Company, p. 10. 
36
 See generally ibid., pp. 6-58. Perhaps the most striking example of a pluralist approach to corporate 
governance are the regional public broadcasting companies in Germany, which are governed by 
‘Broadcasting Councils’ consisting of representatives of the ‘socially significant groups’, including 
ethnic, political, cultural, religions and economic groups. See generally Peter J. Humphreys, Media and 
Media Policy in Germany: The Press and Broadcasting Since 1945, 2nd edition (Oxford: Berg, 1994). 
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a whole); an unfair infringement of the property rights of shareholders; and an 
undemocratic concession of power to unelected and publicly unaccountable company 
directors making decisions about wealth redistribution more properly reserved to a 
community’s elected representatives.37 In this period, the United Kingdom led the 
opposition to proposals such as the early version of the EC Draft Fifth Directive on 
Company Law
38
 which would have required larger companies to adopt a German-
style two-tier board structure and some form of employee participation in corporate 
decision-making.
39
 Indeed, UK policy-makers resisted any interference with decision-
making structures that might have undermined the principle of shareholder primacy, 
instead identifying the areas of corporate governance in need of greatest reform to be 
directors’ competence, directors’ remuneration, directors’ conflicts of interest and 
shareholders’ remedies.40 
 
                                                 
37
 See Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business’. 
38
 Proposal for a Fifth Directive (company structure and the power and responsibilities of company 
boards) OJ No. C131, 13 December 1972; amended proposal OJ No. C240, 9 September 1983; further 
amended  OJ Nos. C 7, 11 January 1991 and C 321, 12 December 1991; finally withdrawn OJ No. 
C5/20, 12 December 1991. 
39
 See Pettet, ‘The Stirring of Corporate Social Conscience’, 307. See also J. J. Du Plessis and J. Dine, 
‘The Fate of the Draft Fifth Directive on Company Law: Accommodation Instead of Harmonisation’, 
Journal of Business Law (1997), 23. In 2001, after years of negotiation, a Council Regulation was 
adopted allowing a Societas Europaea (European company) registered in one Member State to operate 
throughout the European Union under a single set of rules. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE) [2001] OJ L294/1. The 
Regulation allows incorporators to adopt either a one-tier or two-tier governance structure. The EU has 
refused to adopt a single model of employee participation for the European company in light of the 
wide divergence of existing laws in Member States, however, though certain disclosure and 
consultation requirements have been imposed. See Council Directive 2001/86/EC [2001] OJ L294/22; 
Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and the Council [2002] OJ L80/29. See also Paul L. 
Davies, ‘Workers on the Board of the European Company?’, Industrial Law Journal 32 (2003), 75. 
40
 See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (The Cadbury 
Report); Directors’ Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury (The 
Greenbury Report); Committee on Corporate Governance, Final Report (London: Gee, 1998); Law 
Commission, Shareholder Remedies (1997) Cm. 3769; Law Commission, Company Directors: 
Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties (1999) Cm. 4436. 
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The approach to CSR taken by the Hampel Committee is indicative of the consensus 
that had formed by the 1990s.
41
 The Committee insisted that good corporate 
governance should take into account the various stakeholders affected by the 
company’s operations, but was unwilling to mandate particular management 
structures giving those stakeholders representation in decision-making processes or to 
impose legally enforceable duties benefiting those stakeholders. The Hampel 
Committee enthusiastically embraced the proposition that the ultimate objective of the 
company was profit maximisation. It concluded that it would be difficult to devise a 
system where corporate managers would be legally responsible to stakeholders other 
than shareholders, as it would require specific identification of the groups to whom 
duties would be owed and careful definition of the nature and extent of the duties 
owed to each group. The Committee maintained, as had Berle decades before, that 
company directors effectively could end up being accountable to no one, since the 
criteria for judging their performance would inevitably be conflicting and 
unenforceable. Instead, the Committee proposed that public companies should be 
required by the London Stock Exchange’s Listing Rules to disclose in their annual 
report how they have applied principles of good governance (including CSR 
principles), whether they have complied with the provisions of the Combined Code of 
Best Practice, and when they have not, explain their failure to do so. This combination 
of voluntary participation and mandatory disclosure would form the bedrock of New 
Labour’s CSR policy after they rose to power in 1997. 
 
                                                 
41
 Committee on Corporate Governance, Final Report. 
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2. Corporate social responsibility and New Labour 
Before considering New Labour’s CSR policies in greater detail, it is worth restating 
that more direct – and intrusive – options are available to the Government than the 
strategy it prefers, ranging from giving stakeholder groups the right to participate in 
corporate decision-making to providing mandatory consultation to bestowing a legally 
enforceable right (akin to that enjoyed by shareholders) to have one’s interests 
considered by directors in decision-making processes. An example of a more robust 
approach to CSR is found in a Private Members’ Bill introduced by Labour 
backbenchers in 2002 but subsequently dropped.
42
 The Corporate Responsibility Bill 
would have required all companies based or operating in the UK with an annual 
turnover of £5 million or more to publish an annual report addressing the broader 
environmental, social and economic effects of their operations; their employment 
policies and practices; their financial relationships with governments (including those 
suspected of human rights abuses) and political parties; and the manner in which they 
discharged various environmental and social obligations identified in the Bill. In 
addition, the Bill would have required these companies to consult with and respond to 
all groups affected by any of their proposed major projects, and would have required 
companies to file impact statements with regulators concerning the environmental, 
social and economic implications of those projects, with these statements and 
associated background papers being made available to public inspection. In annual 
company reports, directors would have been required to disclose whether they had 
any training, qualifications or experience in connection with environmental or social 
matters. The Bill’s provisions were to be supported by criminal penalties. In addition, 
                                                 
42
 This discussion of the Bill is adapted from the analysis in Stephen Copp, ‘Corporate Governance: 
Change, Consistency and Evolution: Part I’, International Company and Commercial Law Review 14 
(2003), 65, at 70. 
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stakeholders other than shareholders would have been able to bring private actions 
against companies or their directors for any breach of the statutory duties imposed by 
the Act, and if any significant adverse environmental or social effects arising out of a 
company’s operations were associated with the negligence or wilful misconduct of 
company directors in connection with their duties or disclosure obligations under the 
Bill, those directors would have been held personally liable. 
 
This robust approach to CSR does not reflect the policy of the current Labour 
Government. Instead, New Labour’s Third Way agenda for the corporate sector 
emphasises ‘non-intervention in a regulatory sense’ except where necessary to 
promote competitiveness, with a strong inclination towards ‘allow[ing] markets a free 
reign’.43 The Government is primarily concerned that the UK’s company law remains 
‘internationally competitive’ and assuring ‘that we retain our existing companies and 
attract new ones’.44 The Government has been reluctant to interfere with the 
management structures of business or the exercise of business judgment by corporate 
managers. At the same time, the Government recognises that market forces alone will 
not ‘create or sustain ethical frameworks’.45 In March 2000 a Minister within the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was given specific responsibility for CSR, 
and a DTI website dedicated to CSR emphasises the Government’s support of a 
voluntary approach to CSR.
46
 However, this emphasis on voluntarism is combined 
                                                 
43
 See Wheeler, Corporations and the Third Way, p. 36. 
44
 DTI, Modern Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report: Vol. I (2001), para. 1.13, quoted by 
Robert Goddard, ‘‘Modernising Company Law’: The Government’s White Paper’ Modern Law 
Review. 66 (2003), 402. 
45
 See Wheeler, Corporations and the Third Way, p. 53. 
46
 See http://www.societyandbusiness.gov.uk/. 
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with various rules compelling disclosure of the nature and extent of those CSR 
activities actually undertaken. 
 
One example of this approach is found in secondary legislation adopted in 1999 
requiring trustees of occupational pension schemes to include in their published 
investment policy statements an indication as to the ‘the extent (if at all) to which 
social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken into account in the selection, 
retention and realisation of investments’.47 A parallel requirement was imposed on 
local government pension schemes.
48
 The rationale behind these rules is that 
institutional investors (particularly pension funds) hold a high proportion of publicly 
traded shares, and given the public scrutiny such disclosure requirements invite, these 
investors may be encouraged to exercise their power as shareholders in a socially 
responsible way. This focus on investors is part of the Government’s efforts to 
encourage voluntary engagement in ‘socially responsible investing’ (which has its 
own acronym, SRI).
49
 The Government identified ‘the enhancement of shareholder 
engagement and a long-term investment culture’ as one of the four key objectives of 
its Company Law Reform Bill, introduced to the Houses of Parliament in November 
                                                 
47
 Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy etc.) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999/1849, reg. 11A(a) (amending Occupational Pension 
Schemes (Investment) Regulations 1996, S.I. 1996/3127). The amendments were introduced pursuant 
to section 35 of the Pensions Act 1995. 
48
 Local Government Pension Scheme (Management and Investment of Funds) (Amendment) 
Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999/3259 (amending Local Government Pension Scheme (Management and 
Investment of Funds) Regulations 1998, S.I. 1198/1831). These regulations were issued pursuant to 
section 7 of the Superannuation Act 1972. 
49
 SRI investing has strong religious roots. In the mid-1700s, John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, 
noted that the use of money was the second most important subject of New Testament teachings. As 
Quakers settled in North America, they refused to invest in weapons and slavery, a tradition that is 
echoed in more modern SRI strategies that avoid so-called ‘sin’ stocks – typically companies in the 
alcohol, tobacco and gaming industries. See Social Investment Forum, 2001 Report on Socially 
Responsible Investing Trends in the United States (Washington, DC, 2001). 
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2005
50
 and passed into law in November 2006 as the Companies Act 2006.  The Act 
includes a section which gives the Government authority to require institutional 
investors to disclose how they have exercised their voting rights on resolutions tabled 
at company meetings.
51
 
 
The Companies Act 2006 is the end product of a lengthy and comprehensive 
Company Law Review (CLR) launched by the Government in March 1998.
52
 
Although carried out under the auspices of the DTI, much of the work was undertaken 
by an independent Steering Group consisting of lawyers, academics, business 
representatives and civil servants. The Steering Group was guided by a larger 
consultative committee which included representatives from the TUC, and utilised 
several Working Groups in investigating specific issues of company law and 
governance. Upon completion of the CLR the Government issued an initial, partial 
response in the form of a White Paper in July 2002 and, following further 
consultations, a final White Paper, published in March 2005.
53
 This latter document 
                                                 
50
 The other key objectives of the Company Law Reform Bill are: ensuring better regulation and a 
‘Think Small First’ approach; making it easier to set up and run a company; and providing flexibility 
for the future.   The Bill was introduced to the House of Lords in November 2005 and brought forward 
to the House of Commons in May 2006. It received Royal Assent in November 2006 as the Companies 
Act 2006. It is the longest Act ever to have been passed by Parliament as it repeals, and restates in plain 
English, almost all of the current Companies Acts, which it largely replaces. 
51
 The Government’s preference is for disclosure to be made on a voluntary basis, but s. 1277 of the 
Companies Act 2006 provides a reserve power to compel disclosure should a voluntary disclosure 
regime fail to deliver. See Joanna Gray, ‘New company law reform bill: Power to order greater 
disclosure of exercise of voting rights by institutional investors’, Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance 14 (2006), 122. 
52
 For an overview, see John De Lacy (ed.), The Reform of United Kingdom Company Law (London: 
Cavendish, 2002); Goddard, ‘Modernising Company Law’. Among the consultation documents 
resulting from the Review are Modern Law for a Competitive Economy (1998); Modern Law for a 
Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (1999); Modern Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework (2000); Modern Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure 
(2000); Modern Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report: Vols. I and II (2001). 
53
 Depatment of Trade and Industry, Modernising Company Law (July 2002) Cm. 5553 – I, II; and, 
Depatment of Trade and Industry, Company Law Reform (March 2005) Cm. 6456. 
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contained draft clauses that formed the bulk of the first printing of the Company Law 
Reform Bill.
54
 
 
From the outset of the review process, the CLR Steering Group indicated that it would 
not consider fundamental changes to the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance: 
 
We interpret our terms of reference as requiring us to propose reforms which 
promote a competitive economy by facilitating the operations of companies so 
as to maximise wealth and welfare as a whole. We have not regarded it as our 
function to make proposals as to how such benefits should be shared or 
allocated between different participants in the economy on the grounds of 
fairness, social justice or any similar criteria.
55
 
 
Moreover, the CLR Steering Group’s Final Report and the Government’s subsequent 
White Papers all unambiguously endorse the principle of shareholder primacy, 
reflected in a key section in the Companies Act 2006, which states that ‘a director of a 
company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members [shareholders] as a 
whole’. 56 However, the section goes on to state that, to achieve this goal, directors 
should ‘have regard (amongst other matters) to: 
 
                                                 
54
 For an overview of the main issues involved in the consultations on the Government’s White Papers, 
culminating in the publication of the Company Law Reform Bill, see House of Commons Library 
Research Paper 06/30, The Company Law Reform Bill [HL] [Bill 190 2005-2006] (2 June 2006). 
55
 Modern Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (1999), para. 2.5. 
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(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment.’57 
 
These additional considerations reflect the Government’s acceptance of the 
‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach to company law reform, which assumes that 
a company’s relationship with its stakeholders affects the returns to shareholders, and 
that it is therefore in shareholders’ interests that directors take account of broader 
stakeholder concerns.
58
 
 
Another CLR Steering Group proposal accepted by the Government and incorporated 
in early drafts of the Company Law Reform Bill (but later discarded) was that all 
companies of significant economic size be required to produce an Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR) statement as part of their annual reports.
59
 The OFR was 
envisaged as a forward-looking, qualitative statement concerning a company’s 
performance and future prospects, that was intended to supplement the essentially 
                                                                                                                                            
56
 Companies Act 2006, s. 172; Directors’ general duties have hitherto been found only in case law. By 
introducing a statutory statement on directors’ duties the Government’s intention is to make the law in 
this area more consistent and understandable. 
57
 Ibid., s 172: two further considerations to which directors should have regard are listed: ‘(e) the 
desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the 
need to act fairly as between members of the company’. 
58
The Government also considered, and rejected, an alternative approach identified by the CLR 
Steering Group – referred to as the ‘pluralist’ approach – in which the interests of a range of 
stakeholders are accommodated without the interests of a single group (shareholders) being overriding. 
See House of Commons Library Research Paper 06/30, p. 11. 
59
 The 2002 White Paper indicates that companies of significant economic size are public companies 
where at least two of three criteria are met: the company’s annual turnover is greater than £50 million; 
the company’s balance sheet exceeds £25 million; or the company employs over 500 people. Private 
companies can also be considered economically significant, but the criteria are more demanding: a 
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quantitative and historic information that has long been disclosed. For the most part, 
the specific content of a company’s OFR was to be left to the judgment of company 
directors,
60
 but it was anticipated that any material information relevant to the 
company’s various stakeholders would be included in the statement.61 The 
Government hoped that the OFR would further the interests of transparency and 
openness, and that over time the quality of the information disclosed to stakeholders 
and investors would improve without unduly burdening businesses. 
 
Following extensive consultation, the statute requiring companies to produce an OFR 
was passed in March 2005
62
 and clauses relating to the OFR were included in the 
Company Law Reform Bill published in early November 2005.
63
 However, the 
Government suddenly decided to abandon the OFR in late November 2005. The 
surprise announcement was made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who cited as 
the reason for the U-turn the impending introduction, as part of the EU Accounts 
Modernisation Directive, of a new narrative reporting requirement called the Business 
Review, as part of the directors’ report.64 It was argued that the Business Review 
included the key improvements from the OFR but in a more flexible form, and that 
substituting the Business Review for the OFR would avoid ‘gold plating’ an EU 
regulation and help to reduce the regulatory burden on business. However, the 
                                                                                                                                            
turnover of over £500 million; a balance sheet total of over £250 million; or a work force of over 5,000 
employees. See DTI, Modernising Company Law, para. 4.36. 
60
 The Steering Group did identify a few mandatory items that should be included in the OFR. See 
Saleem Sheikh, ‘Company Law for the 21st Century: Part 2: Corporate Governance’, International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 13 (2002), 88, at 92. 
61
 See DTI, Modernising Company Law, para. 4.32. 
62
 The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors’ Report etc.) Regulations 
2005 (SI 2005/1011). The OFR was due to come into force for the financial year ending on or after 31 
March 2006. 
63
 Company Law Reform Bill [HL]. Clauses 393 to 395. 
64
 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003 (OJ No. L178, 
17 July 2003). 
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Business Review makes no explicit references to the need for companies to report on 
social and community matters, unlike the OFR, nor does it require companies to 
declare their policies on social, environmental and employee issues.
65
 Regulations 
repealing the original OFR regulations were introduced in December 2005,
66
 and in 
subsequent parliamentary debates on the Company Law Reform Bill, Government 
ministers found themselves in the uncomfortable position of arguing against 
legislation that they had promoted on previous occasions. The decision to scrap the 
OFR in favour of the ‘lighter-touch’ Business Review may thus signal a weakening of 
the Government’s enthusiasm to promote the ‘business case’ for CSR. 
 
The Government’s CSR strategy may be viewed as an extension of a long-standing 
preference for disclosure regimes in company law, designed to facilitate market 
efficiency by improving information flows. As L. S. Sealy observed a generation ago, 
given the choice between ‘having a fixed rule about something . . . and having no 
fixed rule as to what a company must do but saying that whatever it does has to be 
openly disclosed’, UK policy-makers usually favour the latter option.67 Consistent 
with this predilection, the Business Review does not require companies to act in a 
socially responsible manner but rather encourages them to disclose their CSR policies 
and activities. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
65
 See Julian Oram, ‘The end of the OFR – and Corporate Responsibility? An Inadequate Approach’, 
Accountancy Age, 12 January 2006. However, as pointed out by Timothy Copnall (‘The End of the 
OFR – and Corporate Responsibility? An Adequate Replacement’, Accountancy Age, 12 January 
2006), although the Business Review does not compel companies to report on employees, the 
environment, and on social and community issues, neither was there a blanket requirement for such 
disclosures in the OFR, as they were only required where necessary to enable shareholders to assess the 
success of strategies adopted by a company.  
66
 The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review) (Repeal) Regulations 2005 (SI 
2005/3442). 
67
 L. S. Sealy, Company Law and Commercial Reality (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1984), p. 21. 
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The ‘business case’ for CSR, as discussed in Chapter 1, is straightforward: by 
pursuing policies and activities beneficial to society and the environment that go 
beyond the minimum standards of conduct required by the law, a company enhances 
its value, provided other stakeholders are aware of these policies and activities. Once 
information about a company’s CSR policies and activities becomes widely available, 
‘caring’ companies, it is believed, will benefit economically in the long term, and 
those with a reputation for the single-minded pursuit of shareholder value at the 
expense of other considerations ultimately will do less well as a result of this ‘less 
enlightened’ approach. As Robert Goddard observed, the validity of the 
Government’s contentions about the ‘business case’ for CSR is ‘dependent on the 
effect that increased disclosure brings’.68 To some extent, it is possible to measure this 
effect, and thereby test the validity of the voluntarism principle at the heart of the 
Government’s policy. The rise of socially responsible investing, and the creation of 
ethical funds and market indices to cater to socially responsible investors, makes it 
possible to compare the market performance of publicly traded companies perceived 
to be ‘socially responsible’ with that of ‘less enlightened’ companies. If CSR 
activities are value-creating, as the Government’s policy assumes, this should be 
reflected in the share price for companies with a good CSR record. The remainder of 
this chapter investigates whether there is empirical evidence that this is the case. 
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 Goddard, ‘Modernising Company Law’, 418. 
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Doing Well by Doing Good? 
 
1. The Rise of SRI and the Ethical Funds 
Even without formal disclosure requirements of the kind contemplated by the 
Government, it was common by the second half of the 1990s for companies to include 
‘social responsibility’ sections in their annual reports (which often were addressed to 
their ‘stakeholders’). In part this was a response to the growth of ‘socially 
responsible’ investment strategies worldwide. This expansion was led by US 
investors: by 2001, one out of every eight dollars under professional management in 
the US ($2.32 trillion out of $19.9 trillion) was invested in a portfolio utilising an SRI 
strategy.
69
 In the UK, SRI evolved from an activity carried out largely by church-
based investors and a few ethical unit trusts to one that is now a mainstream activity 
among institutional investors (see Table 1). SRI assets under management in the UK 
grew from £22.7 billion in 1997 to £224.55 billion in 2001.
70
 
Table 1 
Growth in UK SRI Investment Assets 1997-2001 
 
 1997 1999                                                  2001
 £bn £bn £bn 
Church Investors 12.5 14.0 13.0 
SRI Unit Trusts 2.2 3.1 3.5 
Charities 8.0 10.0 25.0 
Pension Funds 0.0 25.0 80.0 
Insurance Companies
1 
 0.0 0.0 103.0 
TOTAL £22.7 bn £52.2 bn £224.5 bn 
 
           1. Note: unit trust assets have been netted off from insurance totals. 
Source: Russell Sparkes, Socially Responsible Investment: A Global Revolution (London: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2002). 
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 Social Investment Forum, 2001 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States 
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 Russell Sparkes, Socially Responsible Investment: A Global Revolution (London: John Wiley & 
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Two major developments spurred the growth in the institutional SRI market in the 
UK: the disclosure requirements imposed on trustees of occupational pension schemes 
discussed above,
71
 and the move by a number of insurance companies to apply SRI 
criteria across all their equity funds by actively engaging with companies through 
dialogue and voting at AGMs.
72
 This form of shareholder activism, or ‘engagement’, 
seeks to protect shareholder value by integrating consideration of SRI issues into the 
mainstream corporate governance process. An alternative approach to socially 
responsible investing is to screen companies included in investment portfolios on 
CSR grounds.
73
 Screening is typically the method used by retail ethical funds.
74
 The 
first ethical fund in the UK was a unit trust called the Stewardship Fund, launched by 
Friend Provident in 1984; now there are over seventy such funds.
75
 Table 2 below 
reveals that the average performance of these ethical funds between June 1998 and 
June 2003 was inferior to the performance of the UK stock market as a whole 
(represented by the FTSE All Share Index) and to non-ethical funds, whether 
measured as a one-year, three-year or five-year investment. 
 
Advocates of ethical investing argue that, standing alone, these figures can be 
somewhat misleading. For example, it may be that lower returns to ethical funds 
                                                 
71
 See nn. 46-47 above. 
72
 Further impetus to shareholder activism was provided in October 2002 by the launch of a new set of 
principles, The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents – Statement of Principles, 
drawn up by the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC). This body comprises the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI), the Association of Investment Trust Companies (AITC), the Investment 
Management Association (IMA), and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). It speaks for 
a membership that controls the vast majority of institutional funds in the UK. 
73
 Screening is usually divided into ‘negative’ screening to exclude unacceptable shares from a 
portfolio and ‘positive’ screening to select companies with superior CSR performance. 
74
 As the term is used here, a ‘fund’ is a portfolio (or collection) of assets, normally shares, that are 
typically professionally managed. 
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simply reflect the fact that they incur higher risk than unscreened funds because they 
are insufficiently diversified – the process of ethical screening limits the universe of 
investments that can be included within an ‘ethical’ portfolio. Several empirical 
studies have attempted 
Table 2 
 
Performance of UK Ethical Funds/Ecological Unit Trusts/OEICS
1
 
 
 
£1,000 
after 5 
years
2
 % Return 
£1,000 
after 3 
years
3
 % Return 
£1,000 
after 1 
year
4
 
% 
Return 
Average for UK 
ethical/ecological 
UT/OEICs £745.66 -25.4 £661.98 -33.8 £793.84 -20.6 
 
 
FTSE All Share (xd adj) £803.66 -19.6 £711.24 -28.9 £824.16 -17.6 
 
Average for All UK 
UT/OEICs £908.50 -9.2 £739.53 -26.1 £830.61 -16.9 
 
1. Open-ended Investment companies 
2. Showing how much an investment of £1000 would be worth after 5 years (from 01.06.98 to 01.06.03) in each fund. 
3. Showing how much an investment of £1000 would be worth after 3 years (from 01.06.00 to 01.06.03) in each fund. 
4. Showing how much an investment of £1000 would be worth after 1 year (from 01.06.02 to 01.06.03) in each fund. 
 
Source: Standard & Poor’s Micropal, 4 June 2003. 
 
 
to control for possible differences in risk associated with different classes of 
investments in order to determine whether investors value a company’s good CSR 
reputation. Those studies – most of which have been based on US data, but a few of 
which have dealt with the performance of UK ethical funds – usually conclude that 
ethical screening leads to similar or slightly lower performance relative to comparable 
unrestricted portfolios, with any differences in the performance of ethically screened 
and unscreened portfolios usually found to be statistically insignificant.
76
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 Standard & Poor’s Micropal, 4 June 2003. 
76
 See, e.g., J. D. Diltz, ‘Does Social Screening Affect Portfolio Performance?’, The Journal of 
Investing Spring (1995), 64-69; J. B. Guerard, ‘Is There a Cost to Being Socially Responsible in 
Investing?’, The Journal of Investing Summer (1997), 11-18; D. A. Sauer, ‘The Impact of Social-
Responsibility Screens on Investment Performance: Evidence from the Domini 400 Social Index and 
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There are other difficulties with trying to draw conclusions about the investor 
response to CSR from studies involving ethical funds. One early UK study found that 
the companies whose shares are selected by ethical funds for investment tend to be 
smaller than those included in the market indices typically used for purposes of 
comparison.
77
 When this size bias is adjusted for, the relative performance of ethical 
funds improves.
78
 A number of US papers have also identified industry sector and 
investment ‘style’ biases that can distort comparisons between ethical and conven-
tional funds.
79
 In addition, the performance of ethical funds is affected by manage-
                                                                                                                                            
Domini Equity Mutual Fund’, Review of Financial Economics 6 (1997), 137. Two studies comparing 
the returns of ethical and non-ethical US funds to each other, to the S&P 500, and to the Domini Social 
Index (DSI) (containing only ethically-screened companies), concluded that, after risk was adjusted by 
using Jensen’s alpha (discussed below), there were no significant differences between the returns for 
ethical and non-ethical funds. S. Hamilton, H. Jo and M. Statman, ‘Doing Well While Doing Good? 
The Investment Performance of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds’, Financial Analysts Journal 49 
(1993), 62; M. Statman, ‘Socially Responsible Mutual Funds’, Financial Analysts Journal May-June 
(2000), 30-39. A study using an extended sample of US ethical funds – including equity, bond and 
balanced funds – found that, after differences in risk were controlled by using Jensen’s alpha and the 
Sharpe and Treynor ratios (see n. 104 below), there was no evidence that social screening affected the 
investment performance of ethical mutual funds in any systematic way. E. F. Goldreyer and J. D. Diltz, 
‘The Performance of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds: Incorporating Sociopolitical Information in 
Portfolio Selection’, Managerial Finance 25 (1999), 23. One early UK study even found some weak 
evidence that ethical unit trusts outperformed market indices. See R. G Luther, J. Matatko and D. 
Corner, ‘The Investment Performance of UK Ethical Unit Trusts’, Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal 5 (1992), 57. 
77
 Luther, Matatko and Corner, ‘The Investment Performance of UK Ethical Unit Trusts’. 
78
 One study, which confirmed this size bias, found that comparing ethical funds to a small cap 
benchmark improved their relative performance. See R. G. Luther and J. Matatko, ‘The Performance of 
Ethical Unit Trusts: Choosing an Appropriate Benchmark’, British Accounting Review 26 (1994), 77. 
Another study compared a sample of ethical and non-ethical funds matched on the basis of fund size 
and formation date and found evidence that ethical mutual funds out-performed on a risk-adjusted 
basis. See C. A. Mallin, B. Saadouni and R. J. Briston, ‘The Financial Performance of Ethical 
Investment Funds’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 22 (1995), 483. Another study which 
adjusted for the small cap bias of ethical funds by using a more sophisticated benchmark model found 
no significant difference between the financial performance of ethical and non-ethical unit trusts. 
A. Gregory, J. Matatko and R. Luther, ‘Ethical Unit Trust Financial Performance: Small Company 
Effects and Fund Size Effects’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 24 (1997), 705. 
79
 See, e.g., D. Di Bartolomeo, ‘Explaining and Controlling The Returns on Socially Screened US 
Equity Portfolios’, Presentation to New York Society of Security Analysts, 10 September 1996; 
Guerard, ‘Is There a Cost to Being Socially Responsible in Investing?’; L. Kurtz, ‘No Effect, or No Net 
Effects? Studies on Socially Responsible Investing’, The Journal of Investing Winter (1997), 37-49. A 
recent paper by Bauer, et al. addressed this issue by investigating the investment styles of 103 German, 
UK and US ethical mutual funds and adjusting their performance for any style tilts. They found little 
evidence of significant differences in risk-adjusted returns between ethical and conventional funds for 
the 1990-2001 period after such adjustments. However, when they split their sample by time they 
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ment fees and transactions costs which are not uniform, and will reflect the ability of 
individual fund managers to make appropriate decisions concerning asset allocation, 
sector selection and security selections within each sector. Together, these con-
founding factors make it difficult to conclude that differences in the performance of 
ethical funds reflect the impact of SRI strategies on investment performance.
80
 
 
On the other hand, by focusing on the performance of ethical indices rather than the 
performance of ethical funds, some of these difficulties can be minimised.
81
 A stock 
market index, in essence, is a number based on a statistical compilation of the share 
prices of representative stocks. Indices are used by investors as tools for investment 
analysis, measuring performance, allocating assets and creating index-tracking 
investment funds. The rise of SRI encouraged the creation of market indices that take 
into account a company’s social and environmental impact as well as the financial 
factors typically considered when decisions about inclusion in indices are made. 
Ethical indices represent well-diversified portfolios of screened stocks that are not 
subject (at least to the same degree) to the confounding effects of small firm bias, 
differences in transaction costs and management ‘style’ biases that plague studies of 
ethical funds. A comparison of the performance of ethical indices with the perfor-
mance of alternative benchmark portfolios could provide a better indication of the 
potential costs, or benefits, associated with CSR investment behaviour. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
found evidence of a ‘learning effect’ whereby older ethical funds catch up after a period of strong 
under-performance while younger funds continue to under-perform both the index and conventional 
peers. See Rob Bauer, Kees Koedijk and Rogér Otten, International Evidence on Ethical Mutual Fund 
Performance and Investment Style, Working Paper (2002). 
80
 See, e.g., Sauer, ‘The Impact of Social-Responsibility Screens on Investment Performance’. 
81
 This argument was outlined by Sauer, ‘The Impact of Social-Responsibility Screens on Investment 
Performance’, 140. 
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2. The FTSE4Good Indices 
The oldest ethical index, dating from May 1990, is the Domini 400 Social Index, 
which monitors the performance of 400 US corporations that pass multiple, broad-
based social screens. Other prominent indices used by US investors are the Dow-
Jones Sustainability Group Index and the Calvert Social Index. The first indices of 
this type used in the United Kingdom were the FTSE4Good Index Series. Introduced 
by the FTSE Group
82
 in February 2001 after several years of development, this series 
initially consisted of eight indices – four benchmark series used as yardsticks for 
performance measurements, and four tradable series upon which financial products 
based on their value can be bought and sold. The series allows investors to track the 
performance of SRI-screened companies in all major financial markets.
83
 The 
FTSE4Good indices cover up to 90% of the world’s financial markets, giving 
investors an unrivalled level of exposure to companies meeting international CSR 
standards. The FTSE4Good Advisory Committee, consisting of independent experts, 
oversees the process of determining which companies should be included in the 
FTSE4Good indices. Company research is provided by the UK firm Ethical 
Investment Research Service (EIRIS) and its international partners. All the indices are 
managed and calculated by FTSE according to a published set of ground rules. 
Certain companies are excluded from the indices altogether because their core 
business is particularly controversial. Thus, tobacco companies, weapons 
manufacturers, owners or operators of nuclear power stations, companies involved in 
                                                 
82
 The FTSE Group, an outgrowth of a joint venture between the Financial Times and the London 
Stock Exchange formed in the 1930s, creates and manages a wide range of market indices. See 
http://ftse.com/About_Us/index.jsp.  
83
 The series covers four markets – the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and Global – and a 
benchmark and tradable index exists for each market covered. 
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mining or processing uranium and companies involved in the production of nuclear 
weapons systems are ineligible for inclusion in the indices.
84
 
 
The criteria for selecting companies for inclusion in the indices were devised after 
FTSE identified several common themes running through various statements 
concerning CSR issued by governmental bodies, non-governmental organisations and 
business groups.
85
 The inclusion criteria are revised regularly and, as of 2006, were 
grouped under the following five headings: ‘environmental’; ‘social and stakeholder’; 
‘human rights’; ‘supply chain and labour standards’; and ‘countering bribery’.86 
Under the environmental criteria, companies are given an ‘impact weighting’ of low, 
medium or high, depending on the industry sector to which they belong: the higher 
the sector’s potential environmental impact, the more demanding the policy, 
management and reporting criteria that must be met.
87
 Under the social and 
stakeholder criteria, companies must meet at least two of seven indicators to qualify 
for inclusion.
88
 Under the human rights criteria, companies are assessed on a sliding 
scale, with the most demanding requirements applied to companies in the ‘global 
resource sector’ (oil, gas, mining) because of their unique power to influence human 
                                                 
84
 FTSE4Good Index Series Inclusion Criteria, 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Downloads/FTSE4Good_Inclusion_Criteria_
Brochure_Feb_06.pdf, p. 1. 
85
 FTSE indicated that it had considered, inter alia, the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; The United Nations Global 
Compact; annual reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International; the Ethical Trading 
Initiative; Social Accountability International; and the Fair Labour Association. See ibid., pp. 5-7.  
86
 Ibid., pp. 3-11. The first three categories have been used since the launch of the FTSE4Good index in 
2001, while the supply chain and labour standards category was introduced in 2004-5 and the 
countering bribery category was introduced in 2005-6. See ibid., p. 2. 
87
 Ibid., p. 3. 
88
 These criteria are: adopting an equal opportunities policy; adopting a Code of Ethics or Business 
Principles; providing evidence of equal opportunities systems; providing evidence of health and safety 
systems; providing evidence of training and employee development systems; providing evidence of 
systems designed to maintain good employee relations; and, participating in charitable or community 
support schemes. See ibid., p. 4. 
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rights practices in developing countries, with slightly less stringent standards applied 
to companies with significant involvement in ‘countries of concern’ because of their 
poor human rights records.
89
 
 
The launch of the initial two FTSE4Good indices in July 2001 provoked immediate 
controversy. Environmental and human rights campaigners protested the inclusion of 
companies such as BP and questioned the stringency of FTSE’s inclusion criteria. On 
the other hand, CBI was critical of the potential damage caused to companies that 
failed to make the list. The exclusion of several leading companies, including Tesco, 
Marconi and The Royal Bank of Scotland, from the initial FTSE4Good indices 
attracted significant media attention. However, these companies and others that were 
initially excluded managed to get in when the Index was reviewed in September 
2001. At the second review in March 2002, it was announced that another twenty-
four companies had joined the FTSE4Good UK Index, and that index is now made up 
over 300 companies, including scores of household names. The inclusive approach 
that FTSE has adopted has left the FTSE4Good indices open to criticism for not being 
ethical enough, despite the detailed criteria for admission FTSE has developed. Some 
of those who think of themselves as ethical investors probably would not want their 
money going anywhere near some of the oil, gas and drugs companies and high street 
banks included in the indices. 
 
Notwithstanding the criticism the FTSE4Good indices have attracted, however, it 
remains true that some companies have been excluded from them. This allows some 
basis for comparison of the performance of the companies included in the 
                                                 
89
 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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FTSE4Good indices with the ‘non-ethical’ companies that have been excluded, which 
in turn allows some empirical testing of the ‘business case’ for CSR that is at the 
heart of the Government’s CSR policy. The results of the empirical tests we have run 
concerning the performance of the FTSE4Good indices are described in the sections 
that follow. 
 
3. Absolute Investment Performance of the FTSE4Good Indices 
To assess the attractiveness of CSR-screened stocks to investors, we compared the 
performance of the two FTSE4Good indices created for the UK market (the 
FTSE4Good UK Index and the FTSE4Good UK 50 Index) with appropriate unrestric-
ted benchmark indices (the FT All Share Index and the FTSE100 Index respectively), 
and a hypothetical ‘Sin Index’ comprised of stocks excluded from the FTSE4Good 
indices.
90
 The unrestricted benchmark indices are representative of the performance of 
the UK’s publicly traded shares on average. However, there is considerable overlap 
between the companies included in the FTSE4Good indices and those comprising the 
benchmark market indices. For example, the FTSE4Good UK 50 Index contains half 
of the stocks that comprise the FTSE 100 Index, as it was constructed so as to enable 
investors to gain exposure to the ethical stocks with the highest market values. 
Moreover, after the second review of the constituents of the FTSE4Good indices in 
March 2002, companies in the FTSE4Good UK Index represented 83% of the FTSE 
All-Share Index. Thus, comparison of the FTSE4Good UK Index with the ‘Sin Index’ 
– a market value-weighted portfolio comprising the tobacco producers, weapons 
manufacturers, uranium extractors and nuclear power station operators excluded from 
                                                 
90
 The use of a specially created ‘Sin Index’ was inspired by the ‘Sindex’ created by the UK magazine 
Money Observer to track the value of twenty-five FTSE 100 index companies initially excluded from 
the FTSE4Good UK index at its launch in July 2001, and by the US ‘Vice Fund’ launched on 30 
August 2002 by MUTUALS.com, a Dallas-based money management firm.  
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FTSE’s ethical indices91 – may give a clearer indication of the relative merits of 
ethical versus non-ethical investment. 
 
Although the FTSE4Good family of indices were only launched on 31 July 2001, it is 
possible to analyse the performance of the identical hypothetical indices back to 1 
July 1996 (assuming the hypothetical indices include the same companies comprising 
the indices in July 2001).
92
 Three time periods are examined. The first period extends 
from 1 July 1996 (by which time many companies were including CSR reports in 
their annual statements) to 1 June 2003. The second and third time periods represent a 
partitioning of the full data-set into two almost equal components; the later 
component contains the entire period in which the FTSE4Good indices have been in 
existence. Figure 1 depicts the Value of £100 invested on 1 July 1996 in a portfolio 
tracking each index, assuming a notional ‘buy-and-hold’ investment strategy. 
 
                                                 
91
 Specifically, the Sin Index is constructed as a market value-weighted average of the return on three 
FTSE sector indices (Tobacco, Mining, and Aerospace & Defence) and on the nuclear power stock 
British Energy. 
92
 Index values based on the initial index constituents are available on a backdated basis through 
Datastream, a company that provides ‘Asset Performance Management’ software and services. 
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Figure 1: Value of £100 invested in a tracking fund in July 1996 
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It is evident from Figure 1 that the ‘Sin Index’ was the worst performer in the earlier 
part of the investment time horizon depicted above, when the stock market was rising 
in what has now come to be recognised as a stock market ‘bubble’ fuelled by 
unrealistic optimism about the prospects for technology-based stocks, particularly 
those related to telecommunications and the Internet.
93
 When the bubble burst in early 
2000 and markets began to slide, however, the Sin Index began to outperform the 
others and has ended up with the greatest value at the end of the investment period. 
Interestingly, the Sin Index performed the best – and the FTSE4Good UK Index 
performed the worst – in the period after the creation of FTSE’s ethical indices. Table 
3 shows that an investment tracking the hypothetical FTSE4Good Index from July 
                                                 
93
 See generally Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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1996 to the beginning of the new millennium would have yielded returns exceeding 
the value of the other indices, but by the middle of 2003 the Sin Index had appreciated 
to achieve the greatest value while the FTSE4Good Index had slumped to record the 
lowest value. This ‘reversal of fortune’ is not entirely surprising. ‘Sin’ stocks such as 
tobacco and defence have been amongst the UK stock market’s best performers after 
the market peaked in early 2000.
94
 Tobacco companies are usually considered safe 
investments in bear markets because they have a reasonably safe and predictable 
profit flow, and defence companies have benefited from increased arms spending 
following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. On the 
other hand, technology-based companies, which are more likely to be classified as 
socially responsible as they generally have the least impact on the environment, have 
been among the worst hit by the new century’s stock market slump.95 
Table 3 
 
Value of £100 invested in a tracking fund in July 1996 
Date 
SIN 
INDEX 
FTSE4GOOD 
UK 50 FTSE 100  
FTSE ALL 
SHARE  
FTSE4GOOD 
UK  
 
 
01/07/1996 £100.00 £100.00 £100.00 £100.00 £100.00 
 
01/01/2000 £184.14 £227.27 £205.87 £192.52 £181.96 
 
01/06/2003 £205.36 £159.42 £135.04 £131.17 £110.81 
 
                                                 
94
 For example, in 2002 the UK tobacco sector rose in value by 20% compared to a 25% fall in the FT 
All Share Index. See R. Miles, ‘Fund closes as ethics lose lustre’ The Times, 15 February 2003. 
95
 The lacklustre performance of FTSE4Good stocks is highlighted by the performance of the ‘Sindex’ 
created by Money Observer magazine (see n. 89 above). Over the twelve-month period to 4 April 2002, 
the stocks in this ‘Sindex’ outperformed the seventy-five companies that were included in the 
FTSE4Good UK Index by 13%. This means that £100 invested in the Sindex would have grown to 
£108, while the seventy-five FTSE 100 companies included in the FTSE4Good Index fell in value to 
£95. Over the three-year period to 4 April 2002, £100 invested in the Sindex stocks would have grown 
to £106, while the ‘Saints’ would have shrunk to £90. See H. Connon, ‘Sinners set to feel the heat’, The 
Guardian, 28 May 2002. 
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4. Risk-adjusted performance of the FTSE4Good indices 
Judging investments on their value alone can be misleading, however, because this 
does not take account of differences in risk associated with different investments.
96
 
The interaction between the risk associated with particular investments and the poten-
tial financial returns from those investments is a central preoccupation of financial 
economics. In this context, risk is a measure of the variability of an investment’s 
performance, not an indication that the company will perform more poorly than low-
risk investment options. To perform a risk-and-return analysis of an investment’s 
relative performance, it is first necessary to calculate the returns on the investment. 
For an individual company, returns are determined by aggregating the capital gain or 
loss with dividend income over a given period of time on a percentage basis (so that 
the performance measure taken can be assessed independent of the size of the 
investment in the company). For a group of companies, such as those included in a 
market index, a mean (or average) return (‘MR’) can be calculated. ‘Variance’ is a 
measure of the ‘risk’ associated with the investment; the greater the variability (or 
‘volatility’), the greater the risk. Variance is a statistical measure of the deviation of 
the actual returns (‘AR’) on the shares from the MR calculated over a time frame 
immediately before the period studied: one can visualise a graph with a time line in 
which ARs appear as a dispersion of dots plotted around a line representing the MR. 
Mathematically, the difference of each AR from the MR is squared,
97
 and these 
squared deviations are added together and averaged. The square root of this average is 
                                                 
96
 This has been a particular problem in assessing the performance of ethical funds, since the process of 
restricting the ‘investment universe’ (and the ability to diversify holdings) by using ethical criteria may 
result in a higher-risk portfolio.  
97
 They are squared so that the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ deviations do not cancel each other out; all of 
the deviations are thereby converted into positive numbers. 
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the standard deviation – and taking the square root of the variance transforms the 
number into the same units as the returns being analysed. 
 
When the mean monthly returns for the two FTSE4Good indices are compared with 
appropriate benchmark indices (see Table 4), we see that the average monthly return 
for the FTSE4Good UK Index is less than that for the FTSE All Share Index between 
1 July 1996 and 1 June 2003, but that the average monthly return for the top fifty 
companies in the FTSE4Good UK Index over that period was greater than that of the 
top 100 UK companies (represented by the FTSE 100) (see Panel A). These observed 
differences, however, are not statistically significant – that is, there is insufficient 
evidence to reject the hypothesis that any observed differences are simply the result to 
chance.
98
 Moreover, no statistically significant differences in monthly returns for the 
two sub-periods (1 July 1996 to 31 December 1999 and 1 January 2000 to 1 June 
2003) were observed (see Panels B and C). Similarly the observed differences in 
volatility (as measured by the standard deviation) for the three time periods studied 
were not statistically significant.
99
 Given the large overlap of companies in the indices 
compared, these results are unsurprising. 
                                                 
98
 ‘Statistical significance’ has a specialised meaning among statisticians. Statistical evidence is usually 
used to test some hypothesis. For example, the hypothesis might be that the difference in the average 
monthly returns of the indices being compared is zero (the null hypothesis). Whenever the difference in 
actual returns differs from zero, this could simply be the product of chance. Statisticians will apply an 
appropriate statistical test to assess the probability of observing the data actually observed if the null 
hypothesis is true. The test will yield a ‘significance level’; if the significance level is .10, for example, 
one would expect to observe data like that actually observed in one out of every ten times a 
measurement is taken, if the null hypothesis is indeed true. The smaller the significance level, the less 
likely it is that the sample came from the population studied assuming the null hypothesis to be true; if 
the significance level is large, one must conclude that there is insufficient evidence against the null 
hypothesis for it to be rejected. It has been common practice for researchers in the physical and social 
sciences to refer to a significance level of .05 as ‘statistically significant’ because at this significance 
level there is a less than 5% chance of erroneously rejecting the hypothesis being tested.  
99
 For the statistically minded, a two-tailed t-test assuming unequal variance was used for the difference 
in mean monthly returns, yielding significance levels ranging from 0.7758 to 0.8973; and a two-tailed 
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Table 4 
 
Mean monthly Return and Volatility comparison 
FTSE4Good UK Index versus FTSE All Share Index and 
FTSE4Good UK 50 Index versus FTSE 100 Index 
 
 FTSE4Good UK FTSE All 
Share 
FTSE4Good UK 
50 
FTSE 100 
  
Panel A: July 1, 1996 to June 1, 2003 
     
Mean monthly return 0.23% 0.44% 0.68% 0.48% 
Standard deviation 4.71%  4.77% 4.94% 4.88% 
  
Panel B: July 1, 1996 to December 31, 1999 
     
Mean monthly return 1.47% 1.59% 2.06% 1.77% 
Standard deviation 4.29% 4.24% 4.75% 4.48% 
  
Panel C: January 1, 2000 to June 1, 2003 
     
Mean monthly return -0.97% -0.68% -0.66% -0.77% 
Standard deviation 4.83% 5.04% 4.80% 4.97% 
 
 
 
Table 5 compares the risk and return of the ‘Sin Index’ with the two FTSE4Good 
indices. The mean returns earned by the ‘sin’ stocks are greater than the mean returns 
earned by the two FTSE4Good indices over the entire period and in period 2 (Panel 
C) but not in period 1 (Panel B). Although the significance levels for these results are 
lower than the findings displayed in Table 4 (indicating there is less of a probability 
that the observed differences were due to chance), none reach the level that financial 
economists consider statistically significant. In contrast, the stocks comprising the Sin 
Index are considerably more volatile than the stocks which comprise the FTSE4Good 
indices over the full period and also in period 2 (Panel C), and these findings are 
                                                                                                                                            
F-test assuming unequal variance of each sample was used for the difference in volatility, yielding 
significance levels ranging from 0.7100 to 0.9393.  
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statistically significant. Again, these results are unsurprising in view of the shift in the 
dynamics of the stock market at the turn of the millennium discussed above. 
 
Table 5 
Mean monthly Return and Volatility Comparison: 
UK ‘Sin Index’ versus FTSE4Good UK indices  
 
 Sin Index FTSE4Good 
UK 
FTSE4Good UK 
50 
 
Panel A: July 1, 1996 to June 1, 2003 
Mean monthly return 1.06% 0.23% 0.68% 
Significance level   0.3325                             0.6651 
Standard deviation 6.14% 4.71% 4.94% 
Significance level   0.0171  0.0510 
 
Panel B: July 1, 1996 to December 31, 1999 
Mean monthly return 1.42% 1.47% 2.06% 
Significance level  0.9668 0.5737 
Standard deviation 5.44% 4.29% 4.75% 
Significance level  0.1384 0.3968 
 
Panel C: January 1, 2000 to June 1, 2003 
Mean monthly return 0.71% -0.97% -0.66% 
Significance level  0.1971 0.2920 
Standard deviation 6.80% 4.83% 4.80% 
Significance level  0.0310 0.0284 
 
Simple comparisons of raw mean monthly returns and standard deviations between 
the FTSE4Good indices, the Sin Index and the unrestricted benchmark portfolios 
ignores possible biases caused by the interaction between the shares included in the 
indices. The risk of a portfolio of shares depends not only upon the risk associated 
with individual shares included within the portfolio, but also on how the shares 
interact with one another. For example, a single set of macroeconomic factors could 
favour some industries represented in the portfolio and disfavour others. Therefore, it 
is desirable to examine the performance of the FTSE4Good indices and the Sin Index 
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relative to their unrestricted benchmark portfolios using a commonly applied measure 
of portfolio performance which adjust for risk, Jensen’s alpha.100 Jensen’s alpha is 
ordinarily used to provide a risk-adjusted measure of the performance of well-
diversified portfolios, and the FTSE4Good indices are intended to provide well-
diversified investment options for the ‘ethical’ investor. Investors in well-diversified 
portfolios are primarily concerned with their exposure to the investment risk which 
cannot be diversified away, known as ‘market’ or ‘systematic’ risk.101 Jensen’s alpha 
measures the actual return over and above what would be a fair return based upon the 
widely used capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which incorporates a coefficient 
(beta) to measure the portfolio’s exposure to systematic risk.  Jensen’s alpha is 
calculated as: 
 ][ ,,,, tftmPtftpp rrrr    
where the term in brackets is the equation for the CAPM; rp,t is the monthly return to 
the portfolio studied; rf,t is the return earned by a risk-free asset (we use the monthly 
return to three-month UK Treasury Bills); rm,t is the average return earned by the 
market as a whole in the relevant time period; and βp represents the CAPM beta 
coefficient, which is a measure of the portfolio’s sensitivity to the stock market as a 
whole. In our study, the unrestricted FT All Share Index was selected as a proxy for 
the monthly return to the market portfolio (rm,t) in deriving an alpha for the 
FTSE4Good UK Index and the Sin Index, while the FTSE 100 Index was selected as 
                                                 
100
 See M. Jensen, ‘The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964’, Journal of Finance 23 
(1968), 389. 
101
 The evidence suggests that an investment in a random sample of around 15-20 stocks eliminates 
most of the unique (or unsystematic) risk associated with an investment, leaving the investor with 
exposure to market-wide (or systematic) risk. See, e.g., M. Statman, ‘How Many Stocks Make a 
Diversified Portfolio?’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 22 (1987), 353. The companies 
included in the FTSE4Good indices are not randomly selected, and thus it cannot be said with 
confidence that all unsystematic risk has been eliminated. Nonetheless, they consist of large numbers 
of companies of substantial size, and this significantly reduces unsystematic risk. The Sin Index, on the 
other hand, is less well-diversified. 
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the market proxy for the smaller FTSE4Good UK 50 Index. A positive alpha implies 
superior investment performance relative to the market as a whole for a portfolio with 
the same market sensitivity (as reflected in the beta); a negative alpha implies 
substandard investment performance relative to the market for a portfolio with the 
same beta. 
 
Table 6 summarises the Jensen alpha values obtained for the FTSE4Good indices and 
the Sin Index over the entire period and over the two sub-periods respectively.
102
 Over 
the entire period from July 1996 to June 2003, the alpha for the FTSE4Good UK 
Index was negative and the alpha for the FTSE4Good UK 50 Index was positive, but 
it cannot be comfortably assumed that these results were not the result of chance.
103
 
Similarly, the positive alpha observed for the Sin Index over the entire study period 
was not statistically significant. However, when the data is partitioned by time, both 
the negative alpha value obtained for the FTSE4Good UK Index between 1 January 
2000 and 1 June 2003 and the positive alpha value obtained for the Sin Index over the 
same period are statistically significant.
104
 It is less clear whether these observed 
                                                 
102
 These values were obtained from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of the sort commonly 
used to test hypotheses about the relationship between variables. The OLS model used was: 
  tptftmPptftp rrrr ,,,,,    
where rf,t, rm,t and rp,t are respectively the monthly returns to three-month UK Treasury Bills, the 
relevant market proxy, and the particular index being studied. The OLS regression was of the excess 
returns of the index studied against excess returns of the appropriate benchmark index, with excess 
portfolio returns being defined as those returns obtained over and above the risk-free return (i.e. rp,t - 
rf,t). 
103
 The p-value represents the significance level. See n. 97 above. The null hypothesis is that Jensen’s 
alpha is zero. The significance level for the alpha value actually observed for the FTSE 4Good UK 
Index was .10, indicating that one would expect to observe data like that actually observed once out of 
every ten times a measurement is taken, if the null hypothesis is true. Financial economists usually do 
not deem this significance level low enough to reject the null hypothesis with any confidence; 
typically, a significance level of .05 or lower is required to deem the result ‘statistically significant’. 
104
 Jensen’s alpha for the FTSE4Good UK 50 Index returns are positive in value but insignificantly 
different from zero, regardless of the time period examined. This suggests that well-diversified 
investors who restrict their CSR investments to the top 50 CSR stocks did not suffer any adverse 
impact on their risk-adjusted returns when the FTSE 100 Index is used as the benchmark portfolio. 
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differences are economically significant: the results indicate that a well-diversified 
investor who notionally held a tracker fund tracking the FTSE4Good UK Index over 
the second period would have had a 0.34% lower risk-adjusted return compared to an 
investment in an FT All Share Index-tracker, and an investor in a fund tracking the 
Sin Index would have enjoyed a risk-adjusted return of 1.41% greater than that 
obtained through a market-tracker. It thus appears that there was a slight penalty 
suffered by investors who held stocks in the FTSE4Good UK Index in the period from 
2000 onward and a somewhat greater reward for investors ‘in sin’ in the same period, 
which coincides with bursting of the stock market bubble in March 2000.
105
 
 
 
                                                 
105
 A second statistical measure of the risk-adjusted performance of an investment is the Sharpe Index, 
which represents the average risk premium per unit of total risk (as opposed to just the systematic risk 
adjusted for by Jensen’s alpha). See W. F. Sharpe, ‘Mutual Fund Performance’, Journal of Business 39 
(1966), 119, and ‘The Sharpe Ratio’, Journal of Portfolio Management Fall (1994), 49. See also J. D. 
Jobson and B. Korkie, ‘Performance Hypothesis Testing with the Sharpe and Treynor Measures’, 
Journal of Finance 36 (1981), 888. Some argue that total risk is a better measure of risk for a socially 
responsible investor than systematic risk, because the use of CSR screens inadvertently subject 
investors to otherwise diversifiable risk because the ‘investment universe’ for them is restricted. The 
Sharpe Index is calculated as (rp - rf) divided by σp, where rp and rf are the average monthly return to 
the portfolio and three-month UK Treasury Bills respectively, and σp is the standard deviation of 
monthly portfolio returns over the period in question. The Sharpe index values obtained for the data we 
have studied pointed in the same direction as the statistical results we have reported here, but none of 
the values were statistically significant.  
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Table 6 
Jensen’s Alpha 
FTSE4Good UK Index versus the FTSE All Share Index as the Market proxy;  
FTSE4Good UK 50 Index versus the FTSE 100 Index as the Market proxy; 
‘Sin Index’ versus the FTSE All Share Index as the Market proxy 
 
 
 FTSE4Good UK 
 July 1, 1996 to June 1, 2003 July 1, 1996 to Dec 31, 1999 Jan 1, 2000 to June 1, 2003 
 αp βp αp βp αp βp 
 -0.0021 0.9575 -0.0007 0.9468 -0.0034** 0.9538 
p-value 0.10  0.79  0.00  
 
 FTSE4Good UK 50 
 July 1, 1996 to June 1, 2003 July 1, 1996 to Dec 31, 1999 Jan 1, 2000 to June 1, 2003 
 αp βp αp βp αp βp 
 0.0020 0.9918 0.0025 1.0301 0.0006 0.9519 
p-value 0.07  0.18  0.64  
 
 ‘Sin Index’ 
 July 1, 1996 to June 1, 2003 July 1, 1996 to Dec 31, 1999 Jan 1, 2000 to June 1, 2003 
 αp βp αp βp αp βp 
 0.0062 0.8604 0.0015 0.7033 0.0141* 1.0231 
p-value 0.23  0.84  0.05  
 
 
Notes: The p-value gives the ‘significance level’ 
* denotes significant at the 5% level ** denotes significant at the 1% level 
 
 
5. Summary of the Empirical Evidence 
 
To date, most empirical assessments of socially responsible investment strategies 
have focused on the relative performance of retail ethical funds. In absolute terms, the 
average performance of such funds has been inferior to that of funds that are not 
ethically ‘screened’, and inferior to the stock market as a whole (see, e.g., Table 2). 
The picture is not as discouraging when the measurements of the comparative 
performance of ethical funds are controlled for risk: in those studies, the evidence 
indicates that the performance of ethical funds is similar or slightly worse than that of 
unscreened portfolios, and that the evidence of weaker performance is not statistically 
significant. 
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These studies have limitations, however. Ethical funds typically are not well-
diversified and are subject to the confounding effects of ‘small firm’ bias, differential 
transaction costs and management ‘style’ biases. The study described in this chapter 
largely overcomes these limitations by focusing on the relative performance of ethical 
indices rather than ethical funds, but the use of indices have limitations of their own. 
Most problematically, the FTSE4Good indices used in this study have been criticised 
for being insufficiently selective: as of March 2002 the criteria for inclusion in the 
FTSE4Good UK Index were satisfied by 83% of the companies in the FTSE All-
Share Index, and all of the companies in the FTSE4Good UK 50 Index were in the 
unscreened FTSE 100 Index. Nonetheless, some companies were excluded from the 
FTSE4Good indices, and a portfolio containing these companies (a ‘Sin Index’) 
provides some basis for comparison. 
 
In absolute terms, a clear pattern is discernible: in the period before the March 2000 
stock market crash, the FTSE4Good UK 50 Index (representing the largest companies 
satisfying the FTSE4Good inclusion criteria) outperformed the market while the 
FTSE4Good UK Index and Sin Index performed slightly worse than the market as a 
whole; and after the crash, the Sin Index outperformed the market by a large margin 
while the ethical indices underperformed the unrestricted market indices (see Figure 1 
and Table 3). After adjustments are made for risk, the observed differences in 
performance of the various indices over the period from 1 July 1996 to 1 June 2003 
are not statistically significant, but the better performance of the Sin Index and the 
weaker performance of the FTSE4Good UK Index after 1 January 2000 is statistically 
significant (if, perhaps, not particularly great in economic terms) (see Table 6). 
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In sum, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter concerning the relative 
performance of the FTSE4Good indices, used as a proxy for socially responsible 
investments, indicates that over the entire period of our study, the application of CSR 
screens did not necessarily result in higher volatility or reduced returns. Over the long 
term, investors would not have been penalised for choosing to invest in the stocks that 
comprise the FTSE4Good indices. On the other hand, there was no evidence that a 
good reputation for CSR enhanced a company’s value on the stock market, either. 
There is also clear evidence that as investments ‘sin’ stocks are substantially more 
volatile than socially responsible investments and CSR-neutral investments. However, 
it appears that during bear markets, ‘sin’ pays: the relative returns of the Sin Index 
(both in absolute terms, and when adjusted for systematic risk) were much greater, 
and the relative returns of the ethical investments worse, when times were hard on the 
stock market. Between 1 January 2000 and 1 June 2003, there was a premium for 
‘sin’ and a discount for ‘virtue’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The central focus of the Government’s CSR strategy has been to place CSR within a 
model of the company as a profit-maximising entity. In this view, resources allocated 
by companies to environmentally benign conduct, enlightened employment policies, 
charitable giving and other socially worthy activities constitute investments in 
relationships with key stakeholders. Warm attitudes on the part of customers, 
suppliers, employees and regulators lead, it is claimed, to enhanced brand value, 
lower employee turnover, reduced risks of adverse government action and ultimately, 
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to greater returns on investors’ capital. In other words, charitable giving and 
regulatory over-compliance are inputs to the company’s overall production process – 
applied, it can be supposed, at levels calibrated to maximise profits and shareholder 
returns. The dramatic growth of SRI in recent years indicates that there may be 
something to the argument that there is a market for corporate social responsibility. 
 
Theories explaining CSR in terms of disguised profit maximisation, however, can 
generate testable hypotheses. Previous empirical studies of the comparative 
performance of ‘ethical’ and ‘non-ethical’ companies did not provide clear evidence 
that CSR improved a company’s value in the stock market, but they did not clearly 
indicate that CSR activities hurt performance, either. While the results obtained in our 
study of the FTSE4Good ethical indices are similarly equivocal, in one respect they 
are not encouraging: they suggest that while companies recognised by FTSE as 
having a good CSR record (putting aside questions of whether this reputation was 
earned) did not fare worse than companies in the ‘Sin Index’ during bull markets, they 
were punished by investors when the markets turned bearish. 
 
There are some caveats to keep in mind. FTSE has not been particularly selective in 
determining whether a company can be included in the FTSE4Good indices, giving 
rise to the criticism that our study has not compared ‘truly’ ethical companies with 
unethical ones, although the strength of tobacco and defence industries in times of 
economic uncertainty provides little comfort to socially responsible investors. It is 
also possible that the full effects of the Government’s disclosure strategy have not 
been felt, and that once consumers and other stakeholders become more aware of the 
CSR records of companies in the marketplace, a good CSR reputation will have a 
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more positive effect on company value. Our study also does not take full account of 
the psychological benefits of the Government’s CSR policy: arguably, if company 
executives are forced to make CSR disclosure statements, they will internalise CSR 
considerations, and this will subtly affect how they carry out their duties. 
 
Nonetheless, the results obtained in our study at least cast doubt on the vitality of the 
‘business case’ for CSR, which in turn draws into question the Government’s reliance 
on the interplay of voluntary action by company executives and mandatory disclosure 
rules. It may be that the most direct way to assure that companies meet social 
responsibilities is to impose legally enforceable obligations through compulsory 
legislation. Certainly, the results of our study do not support the abandonment of a 
strategy to encourage voluntary CSR, but they do indicate that the benefits of this 
approach may only be supplemental to a core strategy based around mandatory 
regulation. 
